Efficient visual information sampling develops late in childhood by Dekker, T et al.
 1 
Final accepted version of Jones et al. “Efficient visual information sampling develops 
late in childhood” revised under action editor Cathie Tamis-LeMonda. 
 
 
Efficient visual information sampling develops late in childhood 
 
 
Peter R. Jones1,2, Linnea Landin3, Aisha McLean1, Mordechai Z. Juni4, Laurence T. 
Maloney5,6, Marko Nardini*,7, Tessa M. Dekker*,Ŧ,1,3 
 
1 Institute of Ophthalmology, University College London (UCL), London, UK. 
2 NIHR Moorfields Biomedical Research Centre, London, UK 
3 Division of Psychology and Language Sciences, University College London (UCL), London, UK.  
4 Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, University of California, Santa Barbara, USA 
5 Department of Psychology, New York University, New York, USA 
6 Center for Neural Science, New York University, New York, USA 
7 Department of Psychology, Durham University, Durham, UK. 
 
 
* TD and MN are joint senior authors on this work. 
Ŧ
 for questions, please contact t.dekker@ucl.ac.uk  
 
 
  
 2 
Abstract 
It is often unclear which course of action gives the best outcome. We can reduce this 
uncertainty by gathering more information; but gathering information always comes at 
a cost. For example, a sports player waiting too long to judge a ball’s trajectory will 
run out of time to intercept it. Efficient samplers must therefore optimize a trade-off: 
when the costs of collecting further information exceed the expected benefits, they 
should stop sampling and start acting. In visually guided tasks, adults can make these 
trade-offs efficiently, correctly balancing any reductions in visuomotor uncertainty 
against cost factors associated with increased sampling. To investigate how this ability 
develops during childhood, we tested 6-11 year-olds, adolescents, and adults on a 
visual localization task in which the costs and benefits of sampling were formalized in 
a quantitative framework. This allowed us to compare participants to each other, and to 
an ideal observer who maximizes expected reward. Visual sampling became 
substantially more efficient between 6-11 years, converging onto adult performance in 
adolescence. Younger children systematically under-sampled information relative to 
the ideal observer and varied their sampling strategy more. Further analyses suggested 
that young children used a suboptimal decision rule that insufficiently accounted for 
the chance of task failure, in line with a late developing ability to compute with 
probabilities and costs. We therefore propose that late development of efficient 
information sampling, a crucial element of real-world decision-making under risk, may 
form an important component of sub-optimality in child perception, action, and 
decision-making. 
 
Keywords: decision-making, perception, information sampling, visuomotor 
development, ideal observer. 
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Introduction 
Everyday actions can have uncertain outcomes. We may try to catch a ball but have 
only partial information about its trajectory. Accumulating more information before 
acting can help reduce this uncertainty, increasing the chance of success. But because 
information typically comes at a cost, we must often decide whether to gather more 
information or act on what we already have.  
 For example, when crossing a busy road, we may pause to estimate the speeds 
and trajectories of oncoming traffic before deciding when to cross. If we gather too 
little information, we dart into traffic risking an unnecessary disaster. Gathering too 
much information, however, carries its own costs as we find ourselves standing beside 
the road indefinitely, missing gaps in traffic we might have crossed. Changes in the 
costs of waiting or the benefit of information, lead to changes in the behaviour that 
maximise expected utility. Late for a meeting, we are more likely to rush into traffic, 
accepting slightly higher risks in return for a timely arrival. On foggy days we may 
sensibly look more carefully before stepping into traffic.    
 Similarly, a goalkeeper defending a penalty kick may leap too soon and end up 
on the wrong side of the net, or observe the striker for too long and leap in the correct 
direction, but have insufficient time to stop the ball. So, while looking reduces the 
keeper’s visual uncertainty, it comes at a cost of motor precision. Since looking too 
long or too little will result in more failed saves in the long run, a quality keeper 
should maximise save-rate by finding the ideal trade-off that balances sampling costs 
and benefits. 
 Such decisions require an assessment of how well one might do with and 
without additional information, and of whether the cost of gathering more information 
is worth the benefit. This is fundamental to all tasks in which information gathering 
can reduce uncertainty about succeeding, and includes not just perception-guided 
actions such as navigating traffic or playing sports, but also more cognitive tasks such 
as deciding how long to study for a test or look around before purchasing a house. 
Here we investigate how and when this fundamental information gathering skill 
develops between childhood and adulthood.  
Adult information sampling behavior has been investigated extensively in the 
cognitive domain, and human performance is typically less than optimal, often 
markedly so. For example, Tversky & Edwards (1966) asked participants to decide 
whether to sample random binary outcomes (light on/off) to learn the underlying 
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probabilities of each possible event (explore), or bet on which event would occur next 
to win points - but without feedback (exploit). Human performance was markedly sub-
optimal:  participants sampled 8 to 9 times the amount of information needed to 
maximize their expected winnings. Busemeyer & Rapoport (1988), using a similar 
costly sampling task, found that participants considered costs and benefits of sampling 
when deciding when to stop, but in some cases also sampled more than they should 
have to maximize their score.  
Contrasting behavior is found in “secretary problems” (Ferguson, 1989) and 
similar tasks, in which adults see a sequence of items differing in value and can either 
select the current item or go on to the next – they cannot go back to a previously 
rejected item. In these tasks, participants tend to stop too soon, lowering their chance 
to maximize winnings (Bearden, Rapoport, & Murphy, 2006; Kahan, Rapoport, & 
Jones, 1967; Rapoport & Tversky, 1970; Seale & Rapoport, 1997).  
Thus, in cognitive sampling tasks with clearly defined optimal strategies, adults 
often fail to follow this optimal strategy and maximize expected gain. In more recent 
free sampling tasks, adults see two lotteries, (e.g., decks of cards with varying points 
and penalties) from which they can freely sample to identify the more profitable lottery 
(Hertwig, Barron, Weber, & Erev, 2004). Participants typically sample only a few 
times (~15-20) before choosing which lottery to play. This has been characterized as 
under-sampling (Hau, Pleskac, Kiefer, & Hertwig, 2008), but without quantified 
sampling costs, it is unclear what the gain-maximizing stopping rule is  (Juni, 
Gureckis, & Maloney, 2016).  
It has been argued that adults in cognitive sampling tasks may be using a more 
adaptive strategy than first appears. For example, under-sampling may in fact reflect 
optimal stopping giving intrinsic costs such as boredom, fatigue, or different value 
assigned to payoff (Dudey & Todd, 2001; Seale & Rapoport, 1997). Participants might 
also be sampling optimally within the constraints of limited memory or planning 
capacity (Busemeyer & Rapoport, 1988; Hertwig et al., 2004; Rakow, Demes, & 
Newell, 2008; Rakow & Rahim, 2010), or base their stopping rules on heuristics, that 
whilst suboptimal, are reasonably successful at identifying the ideal strategy (Evans 
and Buehner, 2011; Fiedler and Kareev, 2011; Hertwig and Pleskac, 2010).  
More recently, sampling decisions have begun to be studied in the visuomotor 
domain, capturing problems that more closely resemble those faced in our road-
crossing or ball-interception examples (Battaglia & Schrater, 2007; Dean, Wu, & 
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Maloney, 2007; Faisal & Wolpert, 2009; Juni et al., 2016). Typically, these tasks have 
a strong emphasis on ideal observer models that capture the costs and benefits of 
visual information sampling, and that test participants’ abilities to balance these factors 
to maximize expected gain. In Battaglia & Schrater (2007) for example, the observer 
can delay his response in order to acquire more information about the location of a 
visual target but this comes at the cost of movement time - and hence precision - to hit 
the target and earn a reward. The typical finding in these tasks is that without much 
task-specific training, participants are able to trade off the benefit of further sampling 
against its costs to maximize their winnings. This suggests that in visuomotor tasks, 
adults are highly adept at estimating and accounting for their own visual sampling 
skills, and make complex sampling choices with surprising speed and automaticity. 
Like adults, children also face many tasks that rely on the ability to decide 
when to stop looking and start acting. In everyday risky activities such as crossing the 
road or playing outside, inefficient sampling choices could have a major impact on 
childhood safety. However, as yet, little is known about the contributions of this 
crucial decision-making skill to visuomotor development. In one recent developmental 
study, children and teenagers’ decisions from sampling were investigated in the 
cognitive domain, using a classic card-sampling paradigm. The results revealed that 8 
year-olds sampled approximately the same numbers of cards as adults to learn the 
payoffs of two lotteries before selecting one to play for points. In contrast, adolescents 
between the ages of 12-14 years sampled significantly less information than children 
or adults before playing, revealing a U-shaped developmental trajectory. Based on 
correlations with questionnaire data, the authors hypothesized that the age differences 
were linked to reduced motivation in the teenage years (Van den Bos & Hertwig, 
2017). However, to date, it is unclear how sampling decisions develop in a visuomotor 
context when the payoff structure derives from a noisy visual estimate – even though 
this is a type of sampling problem young children face very frequently in everyday 
life, and that has major implications for physical safety.  
We may expect that correctly estimating and accounting for the imprecision of 
visual estimates may be challenging early in life, when we have less world experience 
and our visual abilities are still changing. Some evidence for this possibility comes 
from research on sensory cue integration; when faced with two noisy sensory cues 
(e.g., a visual and tactile cue to object size), adults combine these cues into a single 
estimate in a near-optimal way, by taking an average that weights each cue in 
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proportion to its reliability (Ernst, 2012; Ernst & Banks, 2002). In contrast, across a 
range of tasks and cue combinations children only start weighting cues by their 
precisions after the age of 10-11 years, keeping cues separate before this time (Gori, 
Del Viva, Sandini, & Burr, 2008; Nardini, Bedford, & Mareschal, 2010; Nardini, 
Jones, Bedford, & Braddick, 2008).  
One recent study suggests that the ability to weight the rewards and penalties of 
different visuomotor action outcomes by their likelihoods also poses a challenge for 
children up to the age of 11 years (Dekker & Nardini, 2016). When making rapid 
reaches to a display with reward and penalty regions, adults correctly accounted for the 
imprecision of their reaches, and aimed for locations that would nearly maximize their 
expected score (Trommershäuser, Maloney, & Landy, 2003). Children, in contrast, 
aimed for “risky” regions with a high chance of winning but also a high risk of loss, to 
the detriment of their expected score. Interestingly, a similar preference for “risky” 
lotteries with high outcome variability has often been reported in childhood and 
adolescence for gambles with explicitly stated probabilities and values (Boyer, 2006; 
Defoe, Dubas, Figner, & van Aken, 2015; Levin, Hart, Weller, & Harshman, 2007; 
Steinberg, 2008; Weller, Levin, & Denburg, 2011), although it is unclear whether 
similar factors may underlie both types of decisions.  
In any case, adults typically perform close to ideal on sensorimotor decision-
tasks. In contrast, in children younger than ~10 years old, the available sensorimotor 
information is not combined and weighted correctly, leading to substantially poorer 
perceptual performance than that of an ideal observer (Gori, Del Viva, Sandini, & 
Burr, 2008; Nardini, Bedford, & Mareschal, 2010; Nardini, Jones, Bedford, & 
Braddick, 2008). Similarly, in a rewarded setting, this phenomenon with children led 
to substantially lower winnings compared to a gain-maximizing observer under the 
same conditions (Dekker & Nardini, 2016). Therefore, we hypothesized that younger 
children will also make inefficient sampling choices when the costs and benefits of 
sampling are determined by their own visual abilities, and that this ability will improve 
with age. 
To quantify age-related changes in visual information sampling and the 
processes supporting this development, we used in the present study a child-friendly 
adaptation of the visual target localization task described by Juni et al., (2016). We 
chose this task because it captures the complexity of realistic everyday visual sampling 
problems in a formal decision-making framework, with child-friendly task-demands. 
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During the experiment, we asked 6 to 12-year-olds, 13 to 15-year-olds, and adults, to 
locate a hidden target (a cartoon fish) by pressing on a touchscreen. To locate the fish, 
participant could ‘buy’ cues to the target location, but in doing so the potential reward 
was reduced. Each cue was a bubble (marked as a green dot) that appeared on the 
screen (Figure 1). Each dot was drawn from an isotropic bivariate Gaussian (Normal) 
distribution centred on the target. The more dots observed (i.e., sampled), the more 
likely it became that the centroid of the observed dots lay within the target containing 
the fish. The probability of catching the fish thus increases with each additional dot 
observed. However, each additional dot reduced the potential reward (green curve and 
blue line, Figure 2). The expected reward for any number of dots is the product of the 
reward for the fish and the probability of catching it (red curve, Figure 2). The ideal 
observer would sample the number of dots with the highest expected reward (dashed 
line, Figure 2).  
Thus, as in everyday sampling problems (e.g., deciding when to cross a road), 
minimising risk involves estimating the benefits of additional information gathering as 
defined implicitly by noise in the visual estimate, and then trading this information off 
against the sampling cost. As in naturalistic sampling, observers must select the best 
trade-off from a range of potential sampling strategies with different expected payoffs.  
Juni et al (2016) found that adult participants performed this task in qualitative 
agreement with the optimal strategy, buying fewer location cues when the cost of each 
cue increased. In one of their experimental conditions (low stakes), there was no 
patterned deviation in sampling from the ideal; though in a second condition (high 
stakes), participants sampled more information than they should have to maximize 
expected gain (about 1.5 additional cues per trial). 
To investigate how and when these optimal visual sampling skills are acquired, 
we first characterized the efficiency of sampling across childhood, adolescence and 
adulthood. To understand what drives developmental changes, we can then formulate 
hypotheses about candidate processes consistent with the specific deviations from 
optimality observed, and test these within the quantitative framework of the ideal 
observer model.  
Notably, in order to obtain a pure measure of decision making, it is crucial to 
remove any confounds due to immature sensorimotor ability. For example, it is 
possible that some children may actually need to sample more information than adults 
because they are poorer at utilizing the available information (see Jones & Dekker, 
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2017). We accounted for this potential confound by also measuring empirically, in a 
separate control task, how well the ability to hit the target improved as the number of 
cues increased. We then incorporated this measure into the hit probability component 
of the ideal observer model (green curve, Figure 2), against which empirical choices 
were compared. In this way, we were able to make individualized predictions for each 
participant regarding their optimal decision strategy, against which we compared their 
observed performance. 
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Methods  
Participants 
Participants of the main experiment consisted of twenty-nine adults (M=23.89, 
SD=0.79, 20 female), and 129 children and adolescents aged 6-15 years, all with 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision and no known neurological disorders. The 
children were divided into three equal age groups: 30 6-7 year-olds (M=7.12, 
SD=0.11; 17 female); 30 8-9 year-olds (M=8.76, SD=0.10; 13 female); 30 10-12 year-
olds (M=10.93, SD=0.12; 11 female. To test for a possible non-linear (‘U Shaped’) 
trend in development during adolescence, we tested 29 13-15 year-olds (M=14.7, 
SD=0.88, 22 female). In each age group, half of the participants were randomly 
assigned to the high cue reliability condition, and the other half to the low cue 
reliability condition. Six participants whose sampling strategies deviated by more than 
2.5 Median Absolute Deviations from others --- likely reflecting non-compliance with 
task-instructions --- were excluded (5.0%; see Table 1). When these data are included, 
the overall pattern of results remains qualitatively unchanged.  
 Finally, control data was collected from 11 children aged 6-7 years (M=6.95, 
SD=0.13; 5 female). Participants whose sampling strategies deviated by more then 2 
mean absolute deviations from the mean groups strategy, were exclude. Remaining 
numbers after exclusion are reported in Table 1. The research was carried out in 
accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki and the UCL Research Ethics Committee 
approved the experimental procedures (#2280/001). 
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Stimuli and Task 
Stimuli were presented on an Iiyama ProLite LCD touch-screen display (521.3 x 
293.2mm; Iiyama Co Ltd, Tokyo, Japan) connected to a MacBook Pro (Apple Inc., 
Cupertino, CA) running MATLAB Psychtoolbox v3 (Kleiner et al., 2007). Participants 
played a fishing game in which they “bought” probabilistic cues (‘bubbles’) indicating 
the location of an invisible target circle containing a fish (target radius 12.8mm). Each 
cue increased the chance of a correct response (green lines, Figure 2). However, it also 
incurred a 1-point deduction of the reward for a hit, initially set to 20 (blue lines Figure 
2). Current target value was displayed on both sides of the screen (see Figure 1). The 
Figure 1: Participants sampled location cues (dots) drawn from an isotropic bivariate Gaussian 
distribution. There were two conditions differing in standard deviation: high (12.4 mm) or low 
(27.5mm). Stimuli from the high condition are shown. The target is initially worth 20 points. 
Each additional dot increased the chance of locating the target, but reduced the target value by 1 
point. Participants decided when to stop sampling, and then attempted to locate the fish by 
placing a hook on the estimated center of the dot cloud. If the hook fell within the target area, the 
response was scored a hit and all remaining points were awarded. Otherwise, a miss yielded no 
points.    
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participant only paid the cost of the information sampled if they succeeded in catching 
the fish. No cost was imposed when they did not. 
The probabilistic location-cues were green dots (radius: 1.1mm), drawn from a 
zero-mean bivariate Gaussian distribution with covariance matrix: [
𝜎𝑑𝑜𝑡𝑠
2 0
0 𝜎𝑑𝑜𝑡𝑠
2 ]. The 
value of σdots (i.e., the magnitude of external noise) was fixed within subjects at either 
12.4mm (high reliability) or 27.5mm (low reliability). Since the Gaussian distribution 
was centred on the target location and the sample mean is the unbiased minimum 
variance estimator of the population mean of the Gaussian distribution, the target 
location estimate minimizing variance and maximizing probability of hitting the target 
was the centroid (bivariate mean) of the observed cues (i.e., Mood, Graybill, & Boes, 
1974).  As the number of samples, Ndots, increased from 1 to 20, the variance of the 
centroid estimate decreased and the probability of hitting the target increased. If 
participants averaged the dot-cues perfectly, then following the Weak Law of Large 
Numbers (Feller, 1968), the expected standard deviation in the aiming point (centroid) 
around the target decreases at a rate of √𝑁𝑑𝑜𝑡𝑠: 
 
The corresponding probability of hitting the target can then be computed by 
integrating this ideal aiming point distribution (Gaussian with σideal) across the target 
circle (see Supplementary Figure S1  
for details). 
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However, as highlighted in the Introduction, there is no reason to suppose that 
children or adults are ideal in how they average sensory information (Jones, 2018; 
Jones & Dekker, 2017). Participant-specific imprecisions in locating the middle of the 
dot-cloud will introduce additional random-variability in aiming points around the 
target and will concomitantly reduce the hit probability. 
 To account for individual differences in integration ability, we measured hit 
probabilities empirically for different values of Ndots. We did so by asking each 
participant to perform a “fixed Ndots task” after the main task. This was identical to the 
main task, except that the experimenter controlled the number of cues shown on each 
trial. These data allowed us to estimate directly, and for each subject, the probability of 
hitting the target as a function of Ndots (green curves Figure 2). We could then correct 
our analysis of the subject’s decision-making performance for any sub-optimality in 
estimating the centroid of the dots. See the Supplementary Figure S1 for details on 
how this adjustment was performed. 
In the main task, participants were instructed to score as many points as 
possible. This required them to trade off the benefit of a higher hit probability with 
additional dot-cues, against the cost of a 1-point decrease in target-worth per dot. An 
ideal observer would compute the expected score for each Ndots by multiplying the 
target’s current worth with the probability of hitting the target (resulting in the red 
‘expected gain’ curves in Figure 2), and then identifying the Ndots with the highest 
score prediction (ideal Ndots, red peak).  
Figure 2. A formalized model of the sampling 
decision problem: target value (blue line) and 
probability of hitting (green curve; measured for 
each participant in a separate condition) are 
plotted as a function of sample size (x-axis), and 
separately for low (top) and high reliability cues 
(bottom). The expected gain for each Ndots (red 
curve) is the target worth multiplied by 
probability of hitting the target. The ideal 
observer samples the number of dots for which 
the expected gain is highest (circle at intersection 
of the red curve and the dotted line that indicates 
its maximum). A hypothetical  inefficient sampler 
would score less than the predicted maximum, 
either sampling to few dots (squares) or too many 
dots (diamonds) or  mixing  over- and under 
sampling trial by trial (triangle with error bar). 
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We varied spatial cue reliability by changing the standard deviation of the 
sampling distributions, σdots. Cues with low reliability (σdots = 27.5mm) yielded a 
flatter, wider expected gain curve, and cues with high reliability (σdots = 12.4 mm) 
yielded a narrower, more peaked expected gain curve (see Fig 2). Half of the subjects 
were presented with low reliability cues and the other half with high reliability cues. In 
the implausible case of perfect use of the visual cues, the optimal strategy was to 
sample 8 dots in the low reliability condition and 4 dots in the high reliability 
condition. In practice, there was some imprecision in use of the dot-cues - see Table 1 
for ideal numbers of Ndots for the different age groups after adjusting for participant-
specific hit probability functions.  
Because visual cue reliability was fixed within each condition, the sampling 
strategy that maximizes expected gain given a particular hit probability function was 
fixed too, so the ideal observer would sample the same number of dots on every trial 
(circles, Figure 2). In contrast, an inefficient visual sampler might sample a lower or 
higher number of dots than required to maximize expected score (i.e., select a biased 
sampling strategy; squares or diamonds Figure 2), and any trial-by-trial variability in 
sampling behavior will also reduce the expected reward relative to the ideal (triangles 
Figure 2). 
 
Procedure 
Dot-sampling task: Participants were positioned within comfortable reaching distance 
of the touchscreen. First, they were familiarized with the location cues by placing a 
cursor on a saturated dot-cloud (Ndots = 20), and pressing enter to see the location of 
the target (a fish inside a circle) (20 trials). At the start of this training, they were 
instructed that the fish were most likely to hide exactly in the middle of the dot-cloud 
and that they should always aim for this location to get the best possible score. This 
was done to encourage participants to use the ideal response strategy of locating the 
arithmetic mean. However, since we measured hit probabilities empirically in a 
separate “fixed dot task”, our modeling and analyses account for use of different 
strategies, or any age differences in the ability to locate the mean location of the dot-
cloud.   
 Participants then practiced the main task (20 trials) in which they could 
purchase up to 20 dots by pressing space bar at a cost of 1 point per cue, deducted 
from the initial 20-point target reward. If the cursor fell within the target circle when 
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the participant entered their guess, they won the current reward (20-Ndots), at which 
point the circle around the fish turned green and a voice announced the number of 
points won (auditory feedback). If the cursor fell outside the circle, the circle around 
the fish turned red, and a score of “zero points” was announced. To ensure that 
participants understood the instruction to “find the middle of the dots”, they received 
feedback about the arithmetic mean of the dots (indicated by a crosshair) after making 
their response on the first 15 of these 20 trials. The main task consisted of 100 test 
trials. Points won during the test trials were converted into tokens that could be 
exchanged for toys (children) or money (adults) at the end of the experiment. To match 
motivation across ages, participants were only informed of how many toys/how much 
money the tokens were worth at the end of the task. 
 
Fixed dot task: After the main experiment, participants performed a second, similar 
task in which they were presented with fixed Ndots rather than being allowed to choose 
Ndots themselves (25 trials per value of Ndots). The purpose of this task was to identify, 
for each individual, the probability of hitting the target as a function of Ndots, in order 
to account in the main task for any individual differences in visual integration ability. 
Nineteen adults were presented with all Ndots conditions (1 to 20 dots). Since these data 
revealed that hit-probability increased approximately quadratically, we only presented 
the 2, 3, 7 and 15 dots conditions to the remaining participants to minimize test-load, 
and fitted curves (constrained splines) to interpolate measures (see Supplementary 
Figure S1 for details). 
 
Measures 
In the fixed-dot task, a predetermined number of dots was presented on each trial. The 
key outcome measures were the interpolated hit probability as a function of Ndots for 
each participant (Supplementary Figure S1). This allowed us to identify, for each 
individual, which Ndots yielded the highest expected reward, by computing the 
expected gain curve (Target Value x Target Hit Probability) and calculating the 
number of dots that maximized expected reward; group averages in Table 1). In the 
main task, we measured how subjects’ sampling choices deviated from this ideal 
sampling strategy, and how their scores deviated from their best possible scores.  
 
Results 
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In the following sections, we first quantify how much the different age groups deviated 
from the ideal sampling strategy, and how this affected their performance. We then 
investigate the nature of these deviations (i.e., how they compare to the optimal and 
suboptimal sampling strategies depicted in Figure 2). Finally, we hypothesize which 
neurocognitive processes could give rise to these specific age-related changes and 
present further analyses and data testing these hypotheses.  
 
Age Differences in Sampling Efficiency   
To test for age-related improvements in visual information sampling, we first 
tested for age differences in how closely the sampled Ndots approximated the ideal Ndots 
(Fig. 3). For each subject, we determined the Mean Absolute Deviation between the 
Ndots bought on each trial and the individual ideal Ndots (peak expected gain curves Figs 
2 & 4): 
 
 
 
Figure 3A plots group means and 95% CIs for this measure. The ANOVA’s we 
performed revealed that the deviation from the ideal sampling strategy decreased 
significantly with age in both cue reliability conditions (high reliability cues: 
F(4,69)=4.77, p=0.002; low reliability cues: F(4,71)=5.2, p=0.001). Information sampling 
efficiency thus improved with age. However, individual sampling decisions were often 
suboptimal at all ages: analyses of individual participants using Bonferroni-corrected 
one-sample t-tests (113 tests, p < 0.00044) revealed significant differences between 
Ndots sampled and Nideal in 25 out of 27 6-7 year-olds (93%), 22 out of 30 8-9 year-olds 
(73%), 23 out of 27 10-11-year-olds (85%), 21 out of 29 teenagers (72%), and 23 out 
of 29 adults (79%). Thus, although adults were more efficient and closer to their ideal 
sampling strategy than children, many individuals still exhibited suboptimal sampling 
strategies.  
To test how these age-differences in visual information sampling affected task-
performance, we predicted what participants’ score could have been if they had used 
their own ideal strategy on every trial. The “score percentage” is the percentage of this 
ideal score that was actually obtained (Figure 3B). Score percentage increased 
significantly with age for high reliability cues (F(4,69)=5.4, p<0.001) but while a similar 
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pattern was observed in the low cue reliability condition, this effect was not 
statistically significant (F(4,71)=0.8, p=0.53). This might be because deviating from the 
ideal strategy in the low cue reliability condition resulted in smaller reductions in hit 
probability, and hence a lower cost to performance (less steep expected gain curves 
(red) in bottom vs. top panel of Figs 2 and 4).  
  
Figure 3. A. Mean absolute 
deviation from the gain-
maximizing strategy (mean 
± 95%CI). B.  score 
percentage, the percentage 
of the best score prediction  
(set to 100%, red dotted 
line) actually obtained. Stars 
indicate significant 
differences across 
consecutive age groups 
(p<0.05 see Supplementary 
Table1) 
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Younger children’s sampling strategies deviated more from ideal sampling than 
those of adults and this reduced their score. Sampling strategies became increasingly 
more efficient with age and started to resemble those of adults from approximately age 
10 years onwards (see Figure 3., and Supplementary Table S1). Adolescence --- the 
period between age 11 years and adulthood --- is often linked to more risky behavior in 
real life, and it was recently suggested that this may in part be due to a reduced 
tendency to seek out information about probabilities (Van den Bos & Hertwig, 2017). 
In the current experiment deviations between the ideal and sampled Ndots were closest 
to those of adults in adolescents. This outcome suggests that the ability to balance 
costs and benefits to optimize visual information sampling, develops around age 10 
years or soon thereafter, and follows an incremental rather than a U-shaped trajectory.  
 
Age differences in Sampling Bias and Variability 
To understand why younger children’s sampling choices were inefficient, we 
investigated in which specific ways (outlined in Fig 2) they deviated from the ideal 
observer. In Figure 4 we have plotted the individual sampling strategies (mean Ndots) 
against the scores obtained for each age group, as well as the age-specific expected 
gain across Ndots (red “expected gain” curves; thick lines are group averages, thin lines 
are individuals) and the ideal strategy (dotted line). Positive values indicate over-
sampling and negative values under-sampling. The average ideal Ndots and observed 
Ndots are displayed for each age group in Table 1. Notably, the data points in all age 
groups follow the red curves, indicating a reasonable model fit, especially for subjects 
who showed consistent sampling (see Supplementary Figure S2). In the following 
sections we test for suboptimal sampling strategies, as reflected in systematic bias 
towards under- or over-sampling, and variability in sampling (Figure 2). 
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Figure 4: Red data points show the numbers of dots sampled per trial plotted against trial scores (means 
and 95%CI). Scores are shown as proportion of the maximum trial score (20). Red curves indicate the 
expected gain for each Ndots (thick curves show group averages; thin curves show individuals). Note that 
these curves indicate the expected score for the scenario in which the corresponding Ndots is sampled on 
every single trial. The ideal Ndots was computed separately for each individual based on their observed hit 
rates in the fixed-dot condition; see Methods. Therefore, the gain-maximizing strategy/peak of the gain 
curves is centered on zero so that deviations from the ideal strategy are comparable across participants. 
See Table 1 for average group values.  
Figure 5. A: Group-mean 
sampling bias as indexed by the 
signed deviation from the ideal 
sampling strategy (mean ± 
95%CI). Negative values indicate 
a tendency to under-sample. 
Positive values indicate a 
tendency to over-sample. B: 
Group-mean sampling 
consistency as indexed by the 
Standard Deviation of sampled 
Ndots. Stars indicate significant 
differences or trends across 
consecutive age groups (black: 
p<0.05, red: p<0.1 see 
Supplementary Table1) 
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Age Differences in Sampling Bias? 
First we tested if reductions in performance efficiency in childhood were due to a 
systematic tendency to under- or over-sample (sampling bias). Either bias would result 
in a reduction in expected gain - in the case of under-sampling because observers 
played for higher points at an overly great chance of missing the target, and in the case 
of under-sampling because observers improved their hit-rate at an overly great loss of 
target value  (Figure 2, squares and diamonds). To test for age differences in sampling 
bias, we computed the mean signed deviation from the optimal sampling strategy 
(sampled Ndots – ideal Ndots; Figure 5A). Within the low reliability condition, there was 
a significant shift from under-sampling at the youngest ages to slight over-sampling in 
adults (F(4,71)=4.55, p=0.003). In the high reliability condition, children of all ages 
significantly under-sampled while adults did not show any sampling bias, but the age 
difference in bias was not significant (F(4,69)=1.11, p=0.36). Together these findings 
reveal a developmental shift from under-sampling in the youngest children, towards 
more extensive and closer-to-ideal sampling in older children and adults.  
 
Age Differences in Trial-to-Trial Sampling Variability? 
Next, we tested whether variability in sampling strategy could also have contributed to 
reductions in performance efficiency in childhood. The ideal observer in this 
experiment should never deviate from the optimal sampling strategy, as any variation 
comes at some cost to expected gain (Juni et al., 2016). To test for age-differences in 
sampling consistency, we compared the standard deviation of the Ndots sampled. For 
Table 1. For each age group and condition, the number of subjects after outlier removal (columns 2-3), 
σinternal: mean standard deviation of aiming variance around the middle of the dot-cloud (see 
Supplementary Materials S1, from the fixed Ndots condition (columns 4-5), sampled Ndots (columns 6-7), 
and Ideal Ndots (columns 8-9). 
N after outlier 
removal	
σinternal(mm)	 Observed Ndots	 Ideal Ndots	
cue reliability 
condition (σdots)	
high 	
(12mm)	
low	
(28mm)	
high	
(12mm)	
low	
(28mm)	
high	
(12mm)	
low	
(28mm)	
high	
(12mm)	
low	
(28mm)	
6-7 yrs:	 13	 14	 3.4 (0.7)	 6.5 (0.9)	 3.7 (1.6)	 4.6 (2.0)	 4.7 (0.23)	 7.1 (1.5)	
8-9 yrs:	 15	 15	 3.5 (1.0)	 6.1 (1.2)	 3.6 (1.3)	 6.8 (2.7)	 4.8 (0.33)	 6.9 (1.3)	
10-11 yrs:	 13	 14	 2.7 (0.8)	 5.9 (1.5)	 3.3 (0.9)	 6.5 (1.8)	 4.6 (0.03)	 7.1 (0.9)	
13-15 years:	 15	 14	 3.0 (0.7)	 5.3 (0.8)	 4.2 (0.8)	 7.9 (1.5)	 4.8 (0.25)	 7.1 (1.0)	
adults:	 14	 15	 3.0 (0.5)	 5.1 (0.8)	 4.7 (1.1)	 8.4 (1.7)	 5.1 (0.35)	 7.5 (1.0)	
6-7 yrs: 	
no cost control	
n/a	 11	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a	 18.5 (2.6)	
	
n/a	 20	
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cues with high reliability, sampling was significantly more variable at younger ages 
(F(4,69)=2.81, p=0.03; Figure 5B. But the age-related decrease in sampling variability 
was not significant for cues with low reliability (F(4,71)=0.57, p=0.69). Thus, at least for 
high reliability cues, greater variability in sampling over the course of the study likely 
contributed to children’s poorer performance. 
  
Which processes underlie these age-differences in sampling? 
The foregoing analyses show that information sampling develops across childhood, 
with closer-to-ideal sampling strategies resulting in higher target localization scores. 
This development was paired with a shift from systematic under-sampling of visual 
information towards sampling the amount that offers a perfect trade-off between 
information costs and benefits, as well as with less variation in the sampling strategies 
selected. What processes could give rise to this developmental shift in sampling 
choices?  In the following section we present additional analyses, data, and simulation 
to test 4 potential explanations: 
Do children’s sampling strategies deviate more from the ideal because: 
1. It takes the developing system longer to learn the optimal sampling strategy 
over the course of the task (Age differences in learning)? 
2. Younger children assign additional intrinsic cost to sampling, for example due 
to fatigue or boredom (Age differences in sampling costs)? 
3. Children’s stopping rule is more heavily influenced by information that appears 
to provide information about hit probability but is in fact misleading, such as 
dot-spread or trial-to-trial fluctuations in performance (Age differences in 
sensitivity to probability information)? 
4. Children are in fact making a correct trade-off between hit probability and 
target value, but their probability representation is noisy or biased (Age 
differences in the visual uncertainty estimate)? 
 
1) Age Differences in Learning? 
The ideal observer would choose the sampling strategy that maximises gain on each 
trial. However, in practice participants of all ages used variable sampling strategies 
with the greatest variability observed at younger ages. Our ideal observer model infers 
the gain-maximising strategy based on the (implicit) estimate of the uncertainty in the 
visual cue and on sampling costs, but in reality, participants may in part rely on 
 21 
reinforcement learning to identify the ideal strategy. To investigate contributions of 
such learning, we tested whether participants’ sampling decisions improved over the 
course of the task and how this differed across age groups (Figure 6).  
We fitted linear trends to individual deviations from the ideal Ndots across the 
100 experimental trials to quantify shifts towards or away from the ideal sampling 
strategy. We then compared the slopes across age. For cues with high reliability, there 
was a significant overall shift towards more under-sampling over the course of the task 
(slope < 0; t(54)= -3.0687, p=0.0034). This main effect was driven primarily by 
children; Adults did not change their sampling strategy significantly (t(13)=-0.82, 
p=0.43) while children’s sample sizes decreased over time, although this pattern did 
not reach statistical significance in the youngest age group (10-11 t(12)= -2.49, p = 
0.03; 8-9: t(14) = -2.95, p = 0.01; 6-7 t(12) = -1.53, p = 0.15). There was a marginal 
age difference in slope (F(3,51)=2.75, p=0.05). In the low cue reliability condition, 
sampling strategies did not change substantially with age; slopes did not deviate 
significantly from zero t(57)= -1.3408, p= 0.19, and did not differ significantly with age 
(F(3,54)=1,70, p=0.17). In short, adults immediately chose their sampling strategy from 
the start of the task, suggesting they rapidly inferred a close to - though not perfectly - 
ideal strategy and/or were very fast learners. In contrast, younger participants 
consistently under sampled, and if anything, moved further away from the ideal 
strategy over the course of the task, despite receiving constant feedback about their 
score.  Given that there was little evidence for reinforcement learning at any age, a 
slower learning rate is unlikely to fully explain the age differences in sampling. 
Figure 6. Mean Ndots 
sampled across trials 
are displayed per 
age group (columns) 
and conditions 
(rows). Shaded error 
bars indicate 
bootstrapped 95% 
CIs. Stars indicate 
that the slope 
parameter of the 
linear trend fitted 
through individual 
data deviated 
significantly from 
zero (p<0.05)  
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2) Age Differences in Sampling Costs? 
A tendency to gather too little information in younger children could be explained by 
fatigue or boredom, as such factors may impose additional (implicit) costs on dot-
sampling that were not accounted for in the explicit cost function of the ideal observer 
model. To test this, we performed a control experiment with a new cohort of children 
from the youngest age group (the age group that most exhibited under-sampling in the 
first experiment). Eleven 6 to 7-year-olds performed the same low cue-reliability 
condition from the main experiment (see Methods), the only difference was that the 
cost of sampling more dots was reduced from 1 to 0 (i.e., target-worth remained at 20 
points throughout, irrespective of the number of dots Ndots sampled). Clearly, the gain-
maximizing strategy in this case is to sample all 20 dots on every trial. This requires 
frequent button pressing and long test durations, which should amplify any effects of 
fatigue or boredom. Nevertheless, 6 to 7-year-olds sampled substantially more dots 
than before, and did not deviate from the gain-maximizing strategy by any greater 
extent than in the main task (18.5 vs. 20 as compared with 4.6 vs 7.2). Moreover, they 
did not reduce their sampling over the course of the experiment (sampled Ndots start(1-
15)= 17.9 (SD=3.5), sampled Ndots end(85-100)= 18.2; (SD=2.9); see Supplementary Figure 
S3). Thus, it is unlikely that young children’s tendency to under-sample information in 
the main experiment was due to fatigue, boredom, lack of motivation, or failure to 
comprehend the task. These results also confirm that even the youngest children had at 
least some understanding of the ‘probability x value’ structure of the task, since they 
sensibly sampled more information when there were no explicit sampling costs. 
 
3. Age differences in Sensitivity to Probabilistic Information? 
Juni et al. (2016) showed that one reason why adults in their experiment varied their 
sample sizes from trial to trial was that they adjusted their sampling strategy to the 
spread of the sampled dots, sampling more when dot positions were far apart. This 
strategy is suboptimal: when underlying sampling distributions have a fixed standard 
deviation, hit probability is independent of sample spread, which is something 
participants could experienced first-hand in the training trials, and throughout the task. 
However the false intuition that more closely spaced samples are somehow more 
reliable seems deeply ingrained.  
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To test whether this false intuition might explain the more variable and less efficient 
sampling observed in childhood, we extracted the observed dot configurations for 
every trial in which participants viewed 3-14 Ndots (data for other conditions were too 
sparse). For each dot configuration, sample spread was computed as the Root Mean 
Square (RMS) distance of the points from the arithmetic mean. The set of RMS values 
was then divided into two types (RMSstop vs. RMScont.), depending on whether the 
observer stopped sampling at this point or continued to sample more dots on that trial. 
Finally, we computed the mean Sample Spread Difference (SSD) between the two trial 
types,  
          SSD = RMScont – RMSstop, 
and used bootstrapping to compute 95% confidence intervals. If observers were more 
likely to keep sampling when dot-cue spread was high, then SSD would be positive. In 
contrast, if --- as per the ideal observer --- sampling decisions were made 
independently of dot-cue spread, then SSD would be ~0. The results of this analysis 
are shown in Figure 7. First, let us consider the High Reliability (σdots = 12 mm) 
condition. Up to the ages of 8 to 9 years sampling choices were independent of dot-cue 
spread. A tendency to sample more dots when sample variance was greater, especially 
as Ndots increased present in adults (p<0.01), emerged around age 10-11 yrs. (p<0.05), 
although this pattern did not reach statistical significance in adolescents. In the Low 
Reliability (σdots = 28 mm) condition, there was no effect of sample variance for any 
age groups. 
Figure 7. The Sample Spread Difference (SSD) is the difference in root mean squared error 
between trials on which participants continued sampling (RMScont) vs. trials on which they 
stopped (RMSstop). The SSD is plotted across different Ndots for each age group and cue 
reliability. The mean SSD collapsed across Ndots is presented in the right panels. 
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 Thus, in keeping with previous findings (Juni et al. 2016) adults and 
older children’s stopping rules were (incorrectly) affected by dot sample variance in 
the high reliability condition, while younger children were affected less or 
inconsistently by dot-cue spread. There was no significant effect of dot cue spread on 
sampling strategy at any age for Low Reliability cues.  Developmental changes in 
visual sampling such as reduced variance in the Ndots sampled with age - are therefore 
unlikely to be driven by greater sensitivity to dot-spread in younger participants.  
We also tested if greater susceptibility to hits and misses on previous trials 
could explain greater variance in sampling behaviour in the younger age groups, and 
found this not to be the case (see Supplementary Figure S4). This analysis showed that 
participants aged 8-9 years and older, all sampled more Ndots following series of misses 
than after series of hits, but that the youngest children did not adjust their sampling 
significantly depending on previous trial success. This suggests that adults and older 
children may use feedback in similar ways to fine-tune their sampling strategy, but that 
younger children appeared to ignore feedback altogether. 
 
4) Age Differences in the Visual Uncertainty Estimate? 
We next explored whether the tendency to under-sample in younger children may in 
fact be adaptive if you have an imperfect estimate of visual uncertainty. The ideal 
observer model we used to analyse the data (e.g., Figures 2 and 3), assumes that 
participants are perfectly aware of how their chances of hitting the target increases 
with Ndots (i.e., σobs; see Supplementary Figure S1). However, participants may have 
had some error or bias in their estimate of response precision, and this may be more 
extreme in childhood. Could children’s sampling choices in fact be maximising score 
considering such plausible limitations?  
To test this, we first computed the ideal sampling strategy for an observer with 
a noisy but unbiased estimate of how hit probability changes with dot sample size. 
Details on how this model was computed are provided in Supplementary Figures S5 
and S6. With increasing amounts of error in the hit probability estimate, this noisy 
ideal observer sampled fewer dots than the ideal observer with a perfect hit probability 
estimate (see Supplementary Figure S5). Importantly, however, even for large error in 
the visual uncertainty estimate, the reduction in the ideal Ndots to sample was only 
small, and did not approach sampling choices in the youngest age group.  
 25 
 It is also possible that the sampling choices in young children might be 
explained by a systematic bias in the estimated chance to hit the target. Since we had 
no a-priori reason to assume that children systematically under- or overestimate the 
precision of their location estimate, we considered how processing limitations known 
to characterise development (i.e., limited memory), might give rise to such a bias; one 
way in which participants might estimate visual uncertainty for a given sample size, is 
by directly tracking the deviations between each location guess and the target location. 
An observer considering only a limited number of previous trials to compute the 
deviation between location guesses and target due to limited memory for a given Ndots, 
will overestimate the true chance of hitting the target (see Supplementary Figure S6 for 
simulations). However, when we simulated an observer with the maximal bias that this 
strategy could result in, combined with the highest possible amount of uncertainty 
around this biased estimate of hit probability that we could model, the ideal sampling 
strategy was still slightly higher than the Ndots observed in young children (Ndots at age 
6-7 = 4.6, ideal Ndots for the most noisy and biased ideal observer = 5.6 dots), although 
it started approaching child behaviour. So, a similar process could contribute to the 
tendency to under-sample in childhood, but is unlikely to fully explain it. 
 
Discussion  
We used a rewarded target-localization task to measure visual information-sampling 
decisions in 6- to 15-year-olds, and adults. To perform well in the task, participants 
had to weigh the benefit of sampling additional dot-cues against the cost of sampling, 
and identify the sample size that maximized their expected score. This captures the 
problems faced in real world situations in which more sampling reduces uncertainty 
but comes at a cost (see Introduction). Visual cue reliability could either be high or 
low. For each of these conditions, we computed the optimal number of samples 
(maximal expected winnings), and compared human performance to the ideal. We 
measured the efficiency of performance, defined as the ratio of observers’ winnings to 
the maximum possible winnings in that condition. Participants could fail to maximize 
their winnings by consistently sampling too little information (under-sampling) or 
consistently sampling too much (over-sampling). They could also fail by sampling too 
much or too little on some of the trials, even if on average, they sampled the correct 
amount. 
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  The youngest children markedly deviated from the gain-maximizing strategy 
(Figure 3A), and scored less well on the task (Figure 3B). With age, sampling choices 
gradually shifted towards the ideal strategy so that by 10-11 years, children’s sampling 
resembled the near optimal performance of adults. Younger children’s sampling 
choices were less efficient in that they (a) showed a systematic bias towards under-
sampling, and (b) showed more variation in the numbers of dots sampled (Figure 4 and 
5). While this pattern was observed for both cue reliabilities, not all age differences 
reached statistical significance in both cue conditions. This is likely because the 
conditions differed in their sensitivity to these different aspects of sampling efficiency. 
For example, given the strongly peaked gain-landscape for high reliability cues, a 
suboptimal strategy was penalized more heavily and caused greater loss of points. 
Instead, for low reliability cues, there was more room for under-sampling because the 
ideal strategy was not compressed towards the lower end of the scale.  
 Taken together, the data suggested a gradual age-related improvement in visual 
sampling, with adult-like performance reached around age 10-11 years or soon 
thereafter. Below we discuss the processes that might give rise to this development, 
based on our further analyses and control experiments.  
 
More variable sampling in childhood 
For each experimental condition there was only one optimal strategy and the 
participant should choose the same (optimal) number of samples on every trial. The 
ideal observer would always take the same number of samples in each trial of an 
experimental condition (Juni et al., 2016). In contrast, our human observers were prone 
to vary the number of cues sampled across trials, and this tendency was particularly 
pronounced in younger children. 
One possible explanation for this developmental difference is that younger 
children are slower to learn the statistics of the task, and so spent more time exploring 
ineffective sampling strategies. Evidently, when the gain-landscape of a task (i.e., the 
mapping of responses to outcomes) is not exactly known, exploring different response 
strategies can be helpful for learning which is best (Gureckis & Love, 2009). In 
contrast, when, like our adults, an observer is able to resolve the gain landscape 
quickly, we would expect them to adopt the ideal strategy early in the task and stick 
with it. Indeed, they may use previous experience to quickly learn the task by 
generalization (Zhang, Kulsa, & Maloney, 2015).  
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Interestingly, however, even though children in the current study were more 
variable in their sampling strategies, we found no evidence of learning across trials. If 
anything, younger participants moved away from the ideal strategy over the course of 
the session (Figure 6). We therefore considered another factor that might contribute to 
children’s more variable sampling; an over-sensitivity to task-irrelevant information, 
such as trial-by-trial variations in the spread of the dot cues, and/or the outcomes of 
previous trials.  Whilst an ideal observer with perfect understanding of the hit 
probabilities in the current task should ignore these cues, a more realistic observer with 
imperfect knowledge about dot cue reliability and their own averaging skills might use 
these cues, to inform their sampling decisions.  
Adults and older children did sample more information when the spread of the 
existing dot-cues on the screen was high (in line with findings by Juni et al), and when 
they experienced a run of misses in the immediately preceding trials. However, there 
was no evidence for sensitivity to these cues in the youngest children. While children 
varied the number of samples taken from trial to trial, in line with a preference for 
novelty and exploration we could not identify factors indicative of learning that lead 
them to sample more or less. Moreover, children appeared to be relatively insensitive 
to information about success probability and visual uncertainty. Instead, as discussed 
below, more variable sampling in childhood in part reflected a gradual shift towards a 
strategy with greater potential rewards but lower expected gain in the long run. 
 
 
Under-sampling 
On average, adults sampled the gain-maximising number of dots in both cue-reliability 
conditions (although a substantial number of individual adults deviated slightly from 
the ideal strategy). Instead, younger children systematically under-sampled and failed 
to maximize their expected winnings as a result. An age-related shift from under-
sampling towards more efficient sampling was particularly noticeable in the low cue-
reliability condition (Figure 5 top-right panel). However, a similar age-difference 
towards under-sampling emerged over the course of the high cue-reliability condition 
(Figure 6). Thus, children persisted in choosing a sampling strategy with reduced 
expected gain, despite continuous feedback about the deviations between location 
estimates and target locations, hit-rates, and scores.  
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Under-sampling on this task can be described as risk-seeking because it 
involves playing for higher stakes at a greater chance of losing, thus favouring a 
greater range of possible outcomes (e.g., 16 or 0 points) over sampling strategies with 
a smaller outcome range (e.g., 12 or 0 points) but a higher expected score. This is a 
standard definition of risky choice behaviour (Defoe et al., 2015).  
We considered several factors that could potentially account for children’s 
tendency to under-sample.  Firstly, we explored whether children’s sampling decisions 
might be explained by intrinsic cost factors not captured in the ideal observer model in 
Figure 2, such as fatigue or boredom. We did this by running a control experiment in 
which sampling more dots incurred no point-loss. 6- to 7-year-olds in this situation, 
sampled substantially more than the children in the main experiment. Crucially, 
despite making more button-presses and enduring longer trials, these children did not 
reduce their sampling over the course of the control task. This outcome implies that 
children’s substantial under-sampling in the main experiment is unlikely to be due to 
fatigue, lack of motivation, or some other implicit sampling cost. Interestingly, this 
comparison of main and control tasks revealed a sensitivity to both value and 
probability information even at the youngest ages of 6-7 years: children sampled much 
less when sampling incurred a point loss (~4.6 dots, main task), than when sampling 
improved the probability of success without any loss (~18.5 dots, control task). Still, 
while 6 to 7-year-old children were sensitive to both value and probability, their 
sampling decisions were less efficient than those of older children and adults. 
 We next tested whether the trade-off children made in the main task might in 
fact be considered optimal if we assumed noise and/or bias in the estimate of visual 
uncertainty and target hit probabilities. To explore this possibility, we first simulated 
the effects of adding Gaussian noise to an observer’s internal estimate of their own 
visual uncertainty. The largest amount of error that we were able to model (assuming 
equal likelihood of under- or over-estimation) only predicted a small reduction in 
sampling, suggesting that this factor alone is unlikely to explain child performance.  
We also investigated how a biased estimate of hit probability would affect the 
ideal sampling strategy. Because we had no a-priori reason to assume that children 
would systematically under- or overestimate their chances of hitting the target, we 
considered a bias that might plausibly arise from keeping track of the deviations 
between location estimate and the target. Over a large number of trials, the variance 
estimated using this strategy will converge on true visuomotor variance, but across a 
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small number of trials (i.e., given limited memory) total variance will be 
underestimated. We showed that the most extreme underestimation of visual 
uncertainty from this process, combined with the largest error that we could model 
around this biased estimate, came closer to but still did not fully capture the extent of 
under-sampling in the youngest age group (Ndots = 5.6 in simulation, while the 
youngest children sampled Ndots = 4.6 on average).  
Of course, any data can be fitted given sufficient assumptions about underlying 
parameters. However, the fact that these relatively parsimonious changes to our ideal 
observer model unable to explain the level of under-sampling exhibited by young 
children suggests that their inefficiency is unlikely only due to poor insight in their 
own visuomotor abilities, although it is possible that such limitations play some role 
(see below). 
 
Developmental mechanisms of decision-making during sampling  
Adults and older children select the gain-maximizing strategy from the start of 
the visual sampling task, suggesting that they can rapidly learn to estimate and 
compute with probabilistic visuomotor information. Here we show that this ability 
takes until ~age 10-11 years to develop. While more research is needed to understand 
the mechanisms that drive this developmental shift towards increasingly optimal visual 
sampling choices, we can formulate some tentative hypotheses based on current data. 
Our analyses indicate that younger children were less sensitive to misleading 
information that adults and older children. They did not take more samples after a 
series of trials ending in failure or when the cues in a sample were more spread out. In 
addition, children’s performance did not move toward the ideal strategy even after 
extensive experience - the trend was in the opposite direction. In additions, simulations 
revealed that under-sampling at younger ages is not well-captured by a decision-
process that optimally compensates for a poor representation of visual uncertainty due 
to limitations of memory, or to understanding of how this cue affects hit probability.  
Together, these results suggest that younger children may be underweighting or 
“ignoring” - and hence not learning from - probability information, and that their 
choices consequentially are driven too much by potential gains. This could be because 
young children are still developing accurate estimates of how noisy visual information 
affects performance (i.e., the rapid resolution of the gain-landscape) and are therefore 
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putting less weight on this factor, or because the mechanisms needed to scale cost by 
probability are themselves still developing. 
This interpretation is in line with at least two developmental theories of 
decision-making. The first stems from the perceptual decision-making literature and 
posits that children have difficulty accounting for the precision of perceptual estimates 
when combining different types of information, because senses are still calibrating. If 
it is unclear how a sensory estimate maps onto world, it is best ignored (Gori et al., 
2008). It is possible that similar process might constrain younger children’s ability to 
scale the potential value of the target correctly by their estimate of uncertainty about 
the targets position.  
The result is also in line with a second, conceptually related set of theories in 
cognitive decision-making: dual systems or “cognitive imbalance” theories. These 
theories posit that reduced risk-taking in childhood and adolescence reflects high 
sensitivity to reward, combined with a reduced control mechanism that suppresses 
potentially hazardous responses – i.e., responses where the likelihood of failure is high 
(Boyer, 2006; Shulman et al., 2016; Steinberg, 2008). While these dual system models 
typically presume that risk-taking actually increases in adolescence because hormonal 
fluctuations increase imbalance between neural motivation and control processes, in 
the present study the performance improved monotonically throughout childhood.  
This result is in line with a recent meta-analysis of decision-making across 
childhood and adolescence, concluding that most evidence suggests that playing for 
higher-but-riskier stakes decreases linearly (Defoe, Dubas, Figner, & van Aken, 2015). 
However, the results reported here contrast with a recent empirical study by Van den 
Bos & Hertwig (2017), who reported a U-shaped developmental change in 
performance on a cognitive sampling task, across childhood, adolescence, and 
adulthood. Specifically, 8 year-olds and adults collected similar numbers of samples to 
learn the payoff structure of two lotteries before making a final choice for points, 
whilst teenagers sampled significantly less (Van den Bos & Hertwig, 2017).  
 These discrepant results likely reflect differences between the two tasks 
and the tested age range. In the current study, inefficient sampling was most 
pronounced around the ages of 6-7 years, an age range not tested in the previous study. 
Additionally, participants in the decision-from-sampling paradigm of Van den Bos & 
Hertwig (2017) must infer the cost/benefit structure of the gamble by trying sufficient 
lotteries at no sampling cost. In the present task in contrast, the sampling costs and 
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benefits are experimentally defined, and can be inferred directly from the dot-
distribution and point system. Consequently, the types of sampling trade-offs in the 
current task likely rely less on intrinsic cost factors that may distinguish teenage 
sampling preferences, such as motivation to seek information when the benefit is 
unclear (i.e., when rare events have unknown likelihoods and consequences; Van den 
Bos & Hertwig, 2017). The discrepancy across these two studies indicates that the 
development of sampling behavior in childhood and adolescence might be driven by 
different factors, highlighting the importance of understanding which component-
processes drive suboptimal behavior across different stages of development and 
different task-domains (Nardini & Dekker, 2018).  
What factors may explain difference in performance across visuomotor 
sampling and cognitive sampling tasks more broadly? Researchers have investigated 
many different sampling tasks (see Introduction) that potentially differ in the 
"cognitive operations" needed to carry them out. For example, one key step in our task 
is computation of the centroid of a display of points, a "visual routine" in Ullman's 
terms (Ullman, 1984), and an example of a cognitive operation that is a component of 
visual cognition. Is the efficient performance we observe in older children, 
adolescents, and adults, due to the fact that they can tap into powerful visual routines? 
Indeed we found that younger children (who have difficulty with centroid 
computation; Jones & Dekker, 2017) also did less well.  
Could the efficient performance observed be due to some other aspect of our 
task not shared with other sampling tasks where human performance is less efficient? 
We simply do not know what these key different processes are. Understanding how 
different cognitive operations support efficient and less efficient aspects of human 
performance is an important goal of research (Trabasso et al., 1978) but much remains 
to be done (Nardini & Dekker, 2018; Rahnev & Denison, 2018). Some task differences 
may be inconsequential while others may be of great importance. The evident way to 
work out which processes explain performance across different sampling tasks is to 
design tasks that are identical except in one respect. Wu, Delgado, & Maloney (2009), 
for example, compared human performance in decision under risk and in a 
mathematically equivalent visuo-motor task. Only the source of uncertainty differed in 
the two tasks. At first glance, the planning of movements would seems to have little in 
common with decision under risk but the two proved to be remarkably similar 
(Trommershäuser, Maloney, & Landy, 2008). 
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Implications for perceptual development and decisions in the real world 
The ability to trade-off the benefits and costs of gathering new data captured by our 
visual sampling task is central to success in a wide range of tasks in real life. Whether 
navigating traffic, playing sports, or deciding how long to study for an exam, both 
looking too little will reduce expected utility – and hence overall success – of our 
actions in the long run. Even the youngest children tested displayed a basic 
understanding this nuance, since they did not simply maximise hit-rate or potential 
score. However, they failed to find the optimal trade-off between the costs and benefits 
of sampling that secures the best performance, sampling substantially less information 
than they should have to maximise performance. This suggests that previously 
observed delays in development of efficient decision-making in childhood also extend 
to elementary information-gathering decisions during visuomotor tasks. A tendency to 
sample too little information to maximise performance in real-life tasks such as 
crossing a busy road, could have serious consequences for child safety. Therefore, 
having established that children make inefficient visual sampling choices in our well-
controlled reaching task, future studies should investigate how this extends to real-life 
decision-making, using tasks in which sampling costs are defined implicitly and that 
involve more complex body movements and visual scenes.   
The sampling inefficiencies documented here, in particular the under-sampling 
and increased variability observed in younger children, introduce novel factors that 
may contribute to apparent immaturities in perceptual and motor function in 
childhood. This has important implications for interpretation of future developmental 
findings. Consider, for example, developmental studies on coherent form or motion 
perception in noise. In a typical task (e.g. (Hadad, Maurer, & Lewis, 2011), 
participants need to report the average direction of moving dots (e.g. up vs. down), a 
process that requires averaging many samples across space and time. When stimuli are 
not limited in duration (e.g. in Gunn et al., 2002; Hadad et al., 2011), participants 
decide how long to spend collecting information (e.g. averaging motion directions) 
before responding. Our results suggest that the late development of perceptual abilities 
on such tasks – as well as other perceptual tasks in which viewing time may be 
controlled by participants - may be due in part to inefficient sampling strategies, rather 
than – as is more commonly supposed – some inherent inability to extract the 
necessary perceptual information.  
 33 
More broadly, we propose that insufficient information sampling is an 
important component of sub-optimality in childhood perception, action and decision-
making, with implications for real-world decision-making under risk and uncertainty. 
Understanding these implications, and their underlying causes is important because 
this may generate helpful tools for increasing child safety and wellbeing during tasks 
that require children to stop looking and start acting in everyday tasks in traffic or 
sports. 
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Context of the research 
We present the novel finding that fundamental visual sampling skills show a prolonged 
developmental trajectory during childhood, with adult-like proficiency reached only in 
adolescence. This suggests that age-related improvements on tasks in which viewing 
time is controlled by the observer, may in part be due to inefficient sampling 
strategies, rather than – as more commonly supposed – some inherent inability to 
extract the necessary perceptual information. This work should therefore inspire future 
research to test how inefficient trade-offs to ‘look versus respond’ contribute to child 
performance in in everyday tasks such as road crossing or ball interception, or self-
paced visual discrimination.   
By testing data-driven hypotheses within the model-based framework of our 
task, we show that poor performance in early childhood may be due to a suboptimal 
decision-rule, in which the benefits of information gathering are underweighted or 
ignored. This fits in with suboptimal cue integration and “reward/inhibition” 
imbalance models of development, and might be because young children are still 
forming estimates of how their skills affect performance in new task contexts (i.e., the 
ability to quickly resolve a new gain-landscape), or because the mechanisms that scale 
task outcome by probability are still developing. Next studies will be directed at 
disentangling the contributions of these potential mechanisms.  
Our findings also speak to the debate around child versus adolescent decision-
making, because unlike in ‘free sampling’ (Van den Bos & Hertwig, 2017), adolescent 
performance was adult-like on our task, highlighting that different factors may shape 
poor sampling choices at different ages and in different tasks. 
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